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ARTICLES
THE EXTINCTION OF NATION-STATES
Ali Khan*
INTRODUCTION
Hugo Grotius founded his theory of international law upon the con-
cept of territorial sovereignty.' Over the centuries, territorial sover-
eignty has played a key role in the development of international legal
order.' Contemporary principles of territorial integrity and political in-
dependence enshrined in the United Nations Charter and other emi-
nent treaties derive their historical continuity from the Grotian theory.3
The Alliance's aim in the Gulf War to evict Iraqis from Kuwait reaf-
* Professor of Law, Washburn University. M.A., 1972, LL.B., 1976, Punjab Uni-
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1. H. GROTIus, DE JURi BELLI Ac PACKS LiBRi TRES [THE LAW OF WAR AND
PEACE IN THREE BOOKS], Prolegomena §§ 14-15 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925)(original
1625)[hereinafter H. GROrIUs]. Hugo Grotius is the founder of international law. He
first provided a theoretical basis to modern international law. All theories of interna-
tional law must in the final analysis address the Grotian theory. Since Grotius' time,
several schools of jurisprudence, ranging from natural law to critical legal studies, have
explored the analytical, structural and normative dimensions of international law.
These schools provide insights into the general enterprise of international law, and offer
conceptual frameworks within which scholars define and discuss the sources and sub-
jects of international law. International law, however, seems to transcend each school of
jurisprudence. Its institutional and normative growth defies the analytical borders into
which each era confines it. Despite the various contributions these schools made to the
development of international law, the Grotian theory remains powerful. With due re-
spect to the genius of Hugo Grotius, this paper presents a critique of his concept of
territorial sovereignty.
2. M. McDOUGAL, W. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEIPORARY PER-
SPECTIVE 1295 (1981). Today, the territorial principle of jurisdiction dominates both
public and private international law and continues as the basic organizer of the world
political structure. Id.
3. See infra notes 55 to 73 and accompanying text (making reference to Grotian
theory).
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firms that the forced extinction of a nation-state 4 is contrary to interna-
tional law.5 The war also demonstrated the resolve of the international
community to preserve the apportionment of the earth into existing na-
tion-states, even if the division stems from colonialism and is arbitrary
or mischievous.6 Of course, unjustly partitioned nation-states may reu-
nite, voluntarily and through valid legal procedures, thereby eradicat-
ing colonial or other inequities.7 Contemporary international law, how-
ever, rejects forced mergers which destroy the separate being of a
nation-state.
Many examples8 demonstrate that the principles of territorial integ-
rity and political independence, the defining characteristics of the na-
tion-state, have become the peremptory norms of international law.9
4. The term "nation-state" is used to avoid possible confusion between state as an
international person and state as part of a federation. Here, the term nation-state is
used in the international sense.
5. See U.N.S.C. Res. 660 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990) (demanding
that Iraq withdraw its forces "immediately and unconditionally" from Kuwait). The
United Nations Security Council passed many resolutions after the Iraqi invasion. See
U.N.S.C. Res. U.N.S.C. Res. 661, U.N.S.C. Res. 662, U.N.S.C. Res. 664, U.N.S.C.
Res. 665, U.N.S.C. Res. 666, U.N.S.C. Res. 667, U.N.S.C. Res. 669, U.N.S.C. Res.
670, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325-36 (1990) (applying a wide range of sanctions against
Iraq including an economic blockade); U.N.S.C. Res. 674, U.N.S.C. Res. 677,
U.N.S.C. Res. 678, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1561-1565 (1990) (resolving to free Kuwait
by "all necessary means," including the use of force).
6. Iraq justified its invasion and occupation of Kuwait by asserting that British
colonialism wrongfully separated Kuwait from Iraq's Basra Province. Ann Peters, Sad-
dam Hussein Offers to Release Women, Children, United Press Int'l, Aug. 28, 1990.
7. For example, consider Hong Kong and Germany. Hong Kong fell into British
occupation following the Opium War in 1840. $8,000 in Debt, Toronto Star, March 21,
1991, at A7. China desired the recovery of Hong Kong for several years, and, by mu-
tual agreement in 1984, Britain agreed to return Hong Kong to China. Id. China has
begun acquiring some control over the city. People's Republic of China: The Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
April 4, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1511, 1520 (1990). Germany, which was forcibly
divided into two separate nation-states following World War II, was unified by treaty.
In accordance with the right of self-determination, the German people desired to be-
come a united Germany. Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany,
Sept. 12, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186 at 1188 (1990).
8. See Acevedo, The U.S. Measures Against Argentina Resulting From the
Malvinas Conflict, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 323 (1984) (noting that the war between Argen-
tina and Great Britain over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands prompted many states not
parties to the conflict to impose economic and financial restrictions on Argentina for
violating the United Nations Charter); but see Moore, Grenada and the International
Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145, 154-59 (1984) (describing how the United
States justified the invasion of Grenada on the basis of restoring human rights and self-
determination).
9. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 677
(1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN]. It is commonly accepted that Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter, which forbids "the threat or use of force against the territorial




Yet, a discernible counter-trend exists. Under the dictates of late twen-
tieth-century life, the principle of territorial sovereignty is undergoing
an evolutionary transformation. The nation-state appears to be losing
its monopoly on sovereignty. While politicians promoting sovereignty
and juridical equality of states continue to reassert the Grotian theory,
nation-states become increasingly interdependent within the fold of re-
gional and international networks. More importantly, the conditions of
global life liberate individuals from the physical and psychological
boundaries of the nation-state. People living in different continents pos-
sess a new familiarity with each other.10 This ever-increasing proximity
among peoples creates a web of complex relations giving birth to new
sentiments of global harmony."1
Two prominent forces challenge the nation-state's traditional sover-
eignty: economic interdependence and the universal recognition of
human rights. Economic interdependence creates a global market in
which most nation-states can no longer exercise complete sovereignty.
The logic of the global market dictates interdependence, not indepen-
dence. 2 Even economic super-powers depend upon other states, often
finding raw materials, labor and markets outside their territorial
boundaries.
The universal recognition of human rights, meanwhile, transforms
both the relationship between states and the relationship between gov-
ernments and their people. The international law of human rights as-
pires to subordinate the nation-state to the will of the people. Accord-
ingly, governments have less legal authority to invoke the concept of
sovereignty to justify policies that violate fundamental rights of citi-
zens. 3 Moreover, matters that historically belonged to domestic juris-
diction may now be lawfully examined in international fora of human
rights."
10. The Cable News Network (CNN), for example, is available in more than a
hundred countries. Millions of people viewed the live coverage of the Gulf War. This
instant familiarity with world events will change global life in ways still unpredictable.
11. These sentiments are often expressed in songs. "We are the World", for exam-
ple, is a song of human solidarity. Similarly John Lennon's song "Imagine" captures
the feelings of a possible World Community beyond nation-states.
12. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEM.IS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 2-4 (2d ed. 1986) (describing how the current state of international
economic relations create an environment of interdependence).
13. Even though military governments and other dictatorial regimes violate rights
of citizens, they often deny such violations. No government has invoked sovereignty to
justify human rights abuses.
14. See T. BUERGENTHAL & MAHLER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL 116 (1990) (tracing the origins of the international law of human rights to the
adoption of the Charter of the United Nations). A number of other specialized agen-
cies and regional organizations have coordinated their efforts in the human rights area
1992]
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Recognizing the dynamics of economic interdependence and funda-
mental human rights, many regions have begun to establish institu-
tional frameworks within which member states may pool their sover-
eignties.' 6 The European Community best exemplifies this new
phenomenon. 16 The member states of the European Community agreed
to dismantle their internal barriers to facilitate the free flow of goods,
services, and people. 17 Furthermore, these states undertook the protec-
tion of the fundamental rights of all individuals regardless of their citi-
zenship.' 8 Although member states of the European Community re-
main signatories to international agreements that recognize the
principles of territorial integrity and political independence, 9 the
evolution of the Community will gradually diminish the practical as
well as the theoretical significance of territorial sovereignty. The Com-
with the United Nations. Id. at 125. These include the International Labor Organiza-
tions, UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the
Organization of African Unity. Id.
15. Many regional organizations have emerged in the past few decades. Economic
cooperation or regional protection of human rights are often the primary goals of these
organizations. Of course, the European Community is the most successful. Other orga-
nizations include the Arab League, the Organization of American States and the Or-
ganization of African States.
16. Single European Act, opened for signature Feb. 17, 1986, reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 503 (1986). The Single European Act strengthened and codified the European
Community, which is based upon three separate organizations: the European Coal and
Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Atomic En-
ergy Community. Id. at art. 1. See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (creating the ECSC); Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
The Treaty of Rome] (creating the EEC); Treaty Establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 (creating the EAEC). Article 2
of the Treaty of Rome declared the goal of the European Economic Community:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote
throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated rising
of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
Id.
17. Laudati, Report of the Delegation to the European Community: Key Issues in
the 1992 Unification Program, 1990 A.B.A. SEC. INT. LAW & PRACTICE 9-13. By
1992, border controls with regard to persons, goods, services and capital within the
internal frontiers of the Community shall be removed or relaxed. Id.
18. European Convention For The Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5,
(entered into force, Sept. 3, 1953). Many parties to this Convention are not members
of the European Community. Id. at 256. All members of the European Community,
however, are parties to the Convention. Id. This convention is supplemented by seven
protocols. B. CARTER & P. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS
429-50 (1991).
19. For example, all member-states of the Community are parties to the United
Nations Charter, which recognizes the principles of territorial integrity and political
independence and juridical equality of states.
[VOL. 7:197
NA TION-STA TES
munity will, of course, protect its united territory and internal laws
against inimical forces. Yet, the new culture of freedoms and economic
prosperity within the grand borders of the Community initiates a pro-
cess by which member states will evolve into new juridical entities, that
may be called free states.
This Article develops the concept of the Free State. The character of
Free States within the World Community will be akin to that of mem-
ber states (such as France or Germany) within the European Commu-
nity. In fact, the evolution of constituent nation-states within the Euro-
pean Community may provide guidance, if not impetus, to the
emergence of Free State. The World Community of Free States, how-
ever, may or may not evolve in the near future. Nonetheless, the idea of
Free State is useful in understanding the changing characteristics of
global life. Free State is rooted in the ideas of economic cooperation
and human rights.20 Unlike the nation-state, Free State de-emphasizes
the concept of territorial sovereignty and liberates the people from do-
mestic and foreign domination. It restructures the normative role of the
government by mandating a government that is accountable to the peo-
ple. In addition, Free State rejects the concept of borders and invites
the free flow of goods, services and persons. It also promotes unification
of the human family by supporting sentiments of goodwill among the
peoples of the world. Thus, the people's loyalty shifts from the nation-
state to the World Community. To anticipate its own evolution, Free
State envisages the future world as European Community writ large.
To develop the concept of Free State, I first discuss and analyze the
Grotian theory of territorial sovereignty. This theory provides a histori-
cal basis to appreciate the significance of the nation-state in the devel-
opment of international law. I argue, however, that the fundamental
assumptions on which Grotius built his theory are no longer valid. In
view of unfolding global realities, the concept of territorial sovereignty
seems awkward and anachronistic; it is frequently incompatible with
new aspirations of the peoples of the world. Furthermore, the partition
of the planet into jealously guarded nation-states is artificial and
counter-productive. Consequently, the nation-state will regress into ex-
tinction, particularly as its traditional characteristics become dysfunc-
tional in serving the needs of global life. The gradual extinction of the
nation-state, meanwhile, will create favorable conditions for the evolu-
20. The idea of Free State stands upon principals enunciated in leading interna-
tional economic and human rights documents, such as the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, this article will frequently
cite to provisions of these documents for support when describing the characteristics of
Free State.
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tion of Free State. Only Free State can survive in the milieu of human
rights and economic interdependence. Just as the widespread reptile ex-
tinctions coincided with the rise of mammals, the universal degenera-
tion of nation-states will provide an environment for Free States to
flourish. Thus, a critical examination of the Grotian theory supplies a
useful context for understanding the advent of Free State.
At the outset, I caution the reader. The concept of Free State
presented here is rudimentary. I do not know, for example, how and
when Free State will emerge nor what specific characteristics it will
possess. Possibly, Free State will never come into existence. Further-
more, I am not proposing any revolutionary theory similar to the Marx-
ist idea that the state is destined to wither away. Finally, the idea of
Free State appears premature, because many nation-states are power-
ful and many people do not envision beyond their national boundaries.
Widespread patriotism and psychologically charged phrases such as
"my country", "the fatherland" and "the motherland" reveal that
many peoples of the world maintain an attachment to the idea of the
nation-state. To men and women willing to die for their country, the
proposed concept of Free State may seem merely poetic, if not offen-
sive. Nonetheless, the evidence of economic interdependence and uni-
versal human rights, as well as the example of the European Commu-
nity, point toward the emergence of Free State.
II. THE GROTIAN THEORY OF NATION-STATE
In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius built the theoretical edifice
of international law on the foundation of territorial sovereignty, which
divides up the earth into distinct portions and vests each such subdivi-
sion with equal sovereignty. 21 Although territorial sovereignty is a com-
monplace concept in contemporary consciousness, this was not true at
the time Grotius expounded his theory of international law. 2 In fact,
two other powerful and competing conceptions of sovereignty existed:
popular sovereignty 23 and universal sovereignty. 24 Grotius, however, re-
21. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 92-108 (1970). Henry Maine shows that Grotius
derived his theory from the following three postulates:
1) There is a determinable law of nature. Id. at 92.
2) Each nation-state is sovereign. Id. at 94.
3) Natural law is binding on nation-states inter se. Id.
22. Id. at 99. The concept of territorial sovereignty was not always recognized be-
cause long after the dissolution of Roman dominion, the minds of men were under the
empire of ideas that were irreconcilable with this concept. Id.
23. Although the precise origin of popular sovereignty may be difficult to pinpoint,
its close kinship with tribal sovereignty is manifest. Id. at 100. "Tribal sovereignty" is a
concept whereby territorial titles such as king or master came into use only as a con-
[VOL. 7:197
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jected both of them. Instead, he established the theoretical superiority
of territorial sovereignty, which would later become the dominant con-
cept for the development of international law. 20 By rejecting popular
sovereignty, Grotius questioned the prevailing view that sovereignty
must always reside in the people.
In sixteenth century Europe, the notion that the king ruled his people
was old and familiar, but the assertion that the king ruled a defined
territory was new and innovative.26 A population that possessed some
common characteristics such as race, religion, and language had tradi-
tionally been the defining source of popular sovereignty.27 Historically,
the chief of a specific tribe derived his powers from the members of his
tribe.2 8 Because tribal sovereignty was tied to the tribal people and not
to the tribal territory, it was immaterial whether the tribe was nomadic
or attached to a certain territory.29 Accordingly, popular sovereignty
was derived from and exercised over a specific people, regardless of
their attachment to a particular territory.30 By rooting sovereignty in a
specific territory, Grotius repudiated the nomadic implications of popu-
lar sovereignty.31 In fastening sovereignty to a fixed territory, however,
Grotius excluded the popular will as an essential component of sover-
venient mode of designating the ruler of a portion of the tribe's possessions and not of
his people's lands. Id. Under this concept of sovereignty, territorial possession was im-
portant only insofar as it was a convenient way to designate to the ruler a portion of
the tribe's possessions. Id.
24. Id. at 100. Universal sovereignty implies the notion of universal domination. Id.
at 100-01. Rulers under this notion aspire to rule a universal empire and as such would
claim to be emperor of the world instead of merely king of a tribe. Id.
25. Id. at 92-94.
26. H. MAINE, supra note 21, at 107. Territorial sovereignty, the view that con-
nects sovereignty with the possession of a limited portion of the earth's surface, stems
from the theory of feudalism. Id. at 102.
27. See id. at 100 (describing "Anbe" sovereignty among the Franks, the Burgan-
dians, the Vandals, the Lombards, and the Visigoths). Anbe sovereignty attached no
importance to territorial possession. Id.
28. See id. (describing the king of a tribe as king of his people, not of his people's
lands).
29. Id.
30. Id. Even today, nation-states exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over their na-
tionals even if the nationals live outside the country. See generally, L. HENKIN. supra
note 9, at 835-36 (citing Indian, British, French and German criminal statutes applica-
ble on the basis of nationality). This might be the remnant of the nomadic implications
of tribal sovereignty. International law recognizes nationality as a basis of jurisdiction.
See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (holding that a nation-state may exercise juris-
diction to tax the income of its nationals living abroad even if the source of their in-
come is based in another state); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (hold-
ing that a nation-state may order the issuance of a subpoena requiring the appearance
as a witness of a national living abroad).
31. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. I, ch. III, § VII. The state, not the people, is
the common subject of sovereignty. Id.
1992]
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eignty.32 Territorial sovereignty does not require that the people living
in a given territory have a common characteristic. Rather, different ra-
cial, religious, and linguistic groups may be subject to the territorial
sovereign because such a sovereign derives his authority primarily from
the existence of the territory, and only secondarily, if at all, from the
people in residence.3  Ordinarily, territorial sovereignty remains within
its own boundaries, and the territorial sovereign claims no authority
over the people living outside the territory. The territorial sovereign
stands in the same relation to his territory as the baron to his estate or
the tenant to his freehold.
3 4
Grotius also refuted the competing idea of universal sovereignty.3 5
Universal sovereignty is neither population-specific nor territory-spe-
cific but instead claims authority over all peoples and all territories of
the world.3 1 Universal sovereignty regards the world as a single realm
that should not be broken into separate territories. Accordingly, it does
not divide the peoples of the earth: all people constitute a grand human
community which must be accountable to the same universal sovereign.
Historically, the great religions of the world, such as Christianity,
claimed universal sovereignty. God and His Representatives, however,
have not been the only claimants to universal authority. Great Emper-
ors of Rome and the so-called Conquerors of the World pursued uni-
versal sovereignty as well. 3 7
In the Grotian era, both the Catholic Church and the Romano-Ger-
man Empire aspired to create a universal order supported by competing
sources of legitimacy. The Church invoked divine authority based upon
faith, whereas the imperial throne claimed positive authority rooted in
force. To Grotius, neither was acceptable. As a Protestant, Grotius was
reluctant to accept the direct or indirect universal jurisdiction of the
Catholic Church.38 As a Dutchman, he refused to accept the universal
authority of the Romano-German Empire.39 While these personal
predilections might have influenced his theory, Grotius rejected univer-
sal sovereignty for another reason. Even in the Grotian period, the
32. Id. at bk. I, ch. III, § VIII.
33. Id.
34. H. MAINE, supra note 21, at 103-04.
35. Id. at 107. Universal sovereignty is a precursor to the notion of territorial sover-
eignty. Id. at 101.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 101-102. For example, the kings of France aspired to rule a universal
empire. Id.
38. J. SCOTT, Introduction to H. GROTIus, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, supra




world appeared larger than the Romano-German empire. Moreover,
not all people were Christians, let alone Catholics. Thus, any interna-
tional legal order built within the confines of a European Empire or
Christianity would have been parochial, not universal.
Grotius instigated a powerful idea that presented sovereign nation-
states both as subjects and as authors of international law. Notwith-
standing its future viability, however, the Grotian blueprint for the in-
ternational legal system was speculative: the Grotian theory surfaced at
a time when the idea of a universal empire was still tenable.40 The
success of Grotian theory therefore depended on whether the claimants
to universal sovereignty failed. History sided with Grotius. Neither the
Empire nor the Church succeeded in establishing the ultimate source of
universal norms.41
The Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War (1618-
1648) marked the demise of the Romano-German Empire and created
new territorial sovereignties. The Catholic Church had failed to assert
its moral authority over nations at war with each other. The fall of
both the Empire and the Church paved the way for the implementation
of new ideas. At this critical historical juncture, the Grotian theory
provided a new framework in which nation-states would become the
architects of a new international legal order.
The concept of territorial sovereignty was the linchpin of the new
international framework. It provided a new theoretical basis and a
practical guide to conceive and legitimize such relations. The compet-
ing conceptions of sovereignty, somewhat similar to outmoded biologi-
cal species, proved inefficient and dysfunctional.
In the absence of an effective Imperial Emperor or Universal
Church, for example, no mechanism existed to explain the existing le-
gal relations between different nations. Popular sovereignty proved
equally problematic: such a theory could not accommodate those sover-
eigns who derived their authority from sources other than popular will.
The law of nations would have required the abolition of those forms of
government, including kingships and monarchies, that remained unac-
countable to the people. The Grotian theory discarded these historical
concepts of sovereignty that lacked flexibility to adapt. Note that Gro-
tius' theory was not a theory of political revolution, nor was it a norma-
40. H. MAINE, supra note 21, at 105. Grotian theory appeared theoretically perfect
at the time it surfaced. Id. at 107.
41. Id. at 105-06. Maine explains the decay of both feudal and ecclesiastical influ-
ences during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and the increasing progress during
that time of ideas later organized by Grotius. Id.
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tive theory to preserve the power of the people. Rather, Grotius
pragmatically aspired to build an international legal system.
To justify his theory, Grotius implanted the concept of territorial
sovereignty into the law of nature.42 The bond between natural law and
territorial sovereignty was simple. Natural law presupposed a state of
freedom under which each constituent unit was independent and sover-
eign.43 Because each territorial sovereign was supreme and was not
subject to the legal control of another sovereign, all sovereigns were
juridically equal. Thus, natural law and territorial sovereignty became
mutually supportive, almost collusive, witnesses to testify against the
supremacy of any universal superior. This constituted a near theoretical
coup d'etat against both the Imperial Emperor and the Universal
Church.
Grotius built his theory of international law in successive layers of
natural law and legal positivism. After subjecting territorial sovereignty
to the dictates of natural law, Grotius recognized the authority of na-
tion-states to make international agreements. Grotius, a natural law
theorist, carefully pointed out that "outside of the sphere of the law of
nature, which is also frequently called the law of nations, there is very
little law common to all nations." 4 But Grotius, a legal positivist, rec-
ognized that the will of nations could also be a distinct source of inter-
national law.
45
Grotius declared that if the law of nations "cannot be deduced from
certain principles by a sure process of reasoning, "46 it may "have its
origin in the free will of man,"' 47 and it may derive its "obligatory force
from the will of all nations, or of many nations. '4 8 This legal positivism
recognized the right of nations to make international treaties. Hence-
forth, not only immutable principles of natural law, but also the
changeable will of nations created international law. All nations were
subject to natural law, but they also retained their positivist power to
42. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, Prolegomena at §§ 35-40.
43. J. ScoTT, supra note 38, at xxxi.
44. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, Prolegomena at §§ 23-24.
45. Id. at § 40-41. Grotius carefully distinguished the law of nations from the law
of nature. Id. Although the law of nations was rooted in natural law, the two were not
synonymous. Id. The law of nature, for example, was always the same at different
times and in different places; but the law of nations could vary from time to time and
from region to region. Id. Stated differently, natural law is always universal; the law of
nations is sometimes regional. Thus, regional customs may constitute valid interna-
tional law even though they do not meet the test of natural law. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at § 41.
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manufacture customs and treaties. Thus, nation-states became both the
subjects as well as the architects of international law.
Without requiring any revolutionary changes in the prevailing legal
environment, the Grotian concept of territorial sovereignty furnished a
new flexibility to reconstruct the international order. First, territorial
sovereignty accommodated all forms of government within the nation-
state and made international law neutral to diverse forms of political
organization, thus establishing the principle of political independence. 4
Second, it furnished a theoretical basis for nation-states to enter into
meaningful legal relations and legitimately recognized the positivist
process of making international law through treaties. Third, it vested
each nation-state with naturalized juridical equality in international
law, thereby preserving the equal dignity of each territorial sovereignty.
Finally, it accepted the division of the earth into nation-states, thereby
identifying the subjects as well as the architects of the international
legal system. By excluding direct popular participation, Grotius
presented a system of international law in which territorial sovereigns
assume the primary responsibility for managing the affairs of nation-
states and deciding the questions of war and peace.
III. REAFFIRMATION OF THE GROTIAN THEORY
The Grotian theory presupposed the mythical state of nature in
which each territorial sovereignty was independent and juridically
equal.5" Because natural law dominated jurisprudence at the time, Gro-
tius based his theory of territorial sovereignty in the legitimacy of natu-
ral law. While natural law remained the authoritative jurisprudence for
many centuries, it nevertheless began to lose its prestige with the ad-
vent of legal positivism. The positivist revolt against natural law, how-
ever, did not challenge the concept of the nation-state. In fact, legal
positivism elevated the nation-state to new jurisprudential prestige and
political power, vesting the state with the authority to fashion the do-
mestic legal order and to participate in the formation of international
customs and treaties.
Under both legal positivism and Grotian theory, the territorial sover-
eign is not required to derive his legitimacy from the will of the people.
Professor Hans Kelsen, for example, described the state as a legal order
under which individuals are subject to a certain, relatively centralized
49. J. Scorr, supra note 38, at xxxi.
50. Id. at xxxi.
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coercion. 51 He distinguished the state from pre-state communities and
argued that the pre-state community rules were made by the mutual
consent of the people, while the state rules are made by a centralized
authority that possesses coercive power to enforce them. 52 The only re-
lationship that the people have with the state, Kelsen argued, is based
on coercion. Any attempt to find another bond, he asserted, is destined
to fail.53 Under the Grotian theory, the state derived its sovereignty
from the law of nature; under the Kelsenian theory of law, which re-
jected "metaphysics and mysticism," the state derived its sovereignty
from the effectiveness of its coercive order.5 South Africa, under
apartheid, dramatically demonstrates an extreme example of the Kel-
senian state. Although, perhaps even under the Grotian system, this
morally repugnant form of government remains compatible with the
concept of territorial sovereignty.
If treaties constitute positive international law, the Grotian concept
of territorial sovereignty has firmly established itself in the letter of
law. While customary international law has long recognized the con-
cept of territorial sovereignty, eminent treaties of the twentieth century
began to preserve characteristics of the nation-state in the written
word. In 1933, three hundred years after the first publication of Gro-
tius' The Law of War and Peace, the Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States reasserted the Grotian doctrine that states
are sovereign and juridically equal, regardless of their might. 55 The
Convention also recognized that the existence of a state56 is an objec-
tive fact independent of recognition by other states57 and that the terri-
tory of a state is inviolable. 8
In 1945, the Charter of the United Nations, the founding treaty of
modern international law, affirmed the Grotian principle of sovereign
equality of states. Fifty-one nation-states established an international
51. See H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 286-87 (M. Knight trans. 1967) (dis-
tinguishing states as possessing centralized organs such as a government, a legislature,
and a court system under a national legal order).
52. See id. (describing how primitive law permitted individuals to seek their own
retribution pursuant to decentralized coercive orders).
53. Id. at 287.
54. Id. at 286.
55. See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1934, art. 4, 49
Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 3 Bevans 145, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (establishing the qualifica-
tions and rights of a state as a person in international law).
56. Id. at art. 1. The Convention defines the state as a person under international
law using four criteria: permanent population, defined territory, government, and ca-
pacity to enter into relations with other states. Id.
57. Id. at arts. 3-4.
58. Id. at art. 11.
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organization "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in
the attainment of ... common ends." 9 The United Nations replaced
its successor, the League of Nations, which was established after the
first world war.6 0 According to the Charter of the United Nations, the
United Nations may accept memberships from nation-states. 1 The
principle organs of the United Nations, including the General Assem-
bly,6 2 the Security Council" and the Economic and Social Council,"
all consist of nation-states. Furthermore, only nation-states may appear
as litigants before the International Court of Justice." Even specialized
agencies in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related
fields are established by "intergovernmental"6 6 agreements among na-
tion-states. To preserve the existing partition of the earth against any
forced mergers, the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
nation-state.1
7
Inspired by the United Nations Charter, regional charters of
America, Africa, and Europe reaffirm similar principles that enshrine
the nation-state as an inviolable international person. The Bogota
Charter of the Organization of American States preserves the territo-
rial inviolability66 of member states and maintains that although each
state has a right to self-preservation, the right does not extend to com-
mitting unjust acts against another state."" Likewise, the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity established "respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to
independent existence."'70 The Charter further avowed absolute dedica-
tion to the freeing of African territories that are still dependent.71 Since
59. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 4.
60. Note that the names of both organizations are derived from "nations".
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1.
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 9, para 1. The General Assembly consists of all members of
the United Nations. Id.
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1. The Security Council consists of fifteen mem-
bers of the United Nations.
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 61, para. 1. The Economic and Social Council consists of
fifty-four members of the United Nations. Id.
65. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1976 Y.B.U.N. 1052.
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 57, para. 1.
67. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
68. Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, art. 20, 2
U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
69. OAS CHARTER art. 14.
70. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. III, para. 3,
479 U.N.T.S. 39, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963).
71. OAU CHARTER art. III, para. 6.
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the proclamation of the African Charter, many African territories have
won independence, Namibia being the most recent one. 2 Finally, in
1975, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, also known as the Helsinki Final Act, proclaimed that the
frontiers of all States in Europe are inviolable and must not be as-
saulted.73 In addition to prohibiting the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, the Final
Act bans the use of force to induce another participating state to not
exercise its sovereign rights.
74
In view of the above international agreements, territorial integrity
and political independence appear to be two universally accepted at-
tributes of the nation-state. These two attributes comprise the essential
characteristics of territorial sovereignty. While the territorial integrity
of a state insulates its physical borders, the principle of political inde-
pendence shields its form of government, political ideology and govern-
mental institutions.
The principle of political independence is consistent with the Grotian
postulates that international law is neutral toward different forms of
government and also that each community freely determines its inter-
nal political organization. Thus, the concept of territorial sovereignty,
anchored in eminent treaties, provides a normative basis to assert and
enforce the physical and political sovereignty of the nation-state. Terri-
torial sovereignty further creates a theoretical environment in which all
nation-states, small and large, freely exist.
IV. FREEDOM FROM SUBJUGATION
The Grotian theory of international law excludes the people from the
concept of territorial sovereignty. 75 This exclusion occurred at two
levels. First, Grotian theory denies people the right of self-determina-
tion.76 Second, Grotian theory denies individuals the right to choose
their government.77 Contemporary laws of human rights, however,
72. In 1990, Namibia won its independence. Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, won its
independence from White minority rule in 1980. L'ETAT Du MONDE 1987-1988, 315
(1988). Algeria, Uganda, Swaziland, Nigeria, Kenya, and Zambia won independence
after 1960. Id.
73. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Helsinki Final Act, Aug. 1,
1975, art. III, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1294 (1975).
74. Helsinki Final Act at art. II.





modified the Grotian concept of territorial sovereignty.79 Consequently,
any definition of sovereignty that systematically excludes popular par-
ticipation is no longer valid. Over the years, many peoples have suc-
cessfully asserted their right of self-determination against external sub-
jugation. More recently, the people have asserted their right to be
free from internal subjugation.
Freedom from both external and internal subjugation is the chief
characteristic of Free State. This attribute of Free State emerges out of
aspirations of all people to live free from domination and exploitation.
Anchoring its legitimacy in the law of human rights, Free State
promises freedom; it rejects both the Grotian theory as well as the con-
comitant subjugation of the people.
A. FREEDOM FROM EXTERNAL SUBJUGATION
The desire to live free from external subjugation has inspired many
revolutions. In 1776, the authors of the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence presented a manifesto that rejected foreign rule and articu-
lated the right of self-determination."0 Twentieth century nationalist
and socialist movements, meanwhile, invoked self-determination as a
political principle.81 After the Second World War, however, the princi-
ple of self-determination acquired new prestige when the creators of
the United Nations incorporated the principle into the United Nations
Charter."' Many subsequent international declarations and treaties re-
affirm and explain this principle.88 In 1960, for example, the United
78. Moreover, the First and Second World Wars exposed the brutality of territorial
sovereigns and the fragility of the international legal system. They showed how breach
of territorial sovereignty could result in the horrors of war. World War II also showed
how an unchecked territorial sovereign, Hitler, could commit genocide against his own
people. To "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to reaffirm
faith in fundamental human rights," the victors in World War II attempted to estab-
lish a new international legal order in which nation-states explicitly agreed to respect
territorial integrity of other states. They also agreed to achieve international coopera-
tion in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights. See Preamble to U.N.
CHARTER (providing the rationale for creating the United Nations).
79. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al (reporting the successful independence
struggles of the Baltic states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia).
80. See The American Declaration of Independence (1776) (articulating the right
of self-determination of the American people).
81. See Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL
OF RIGHTS 92-93 (L. Henkin ed. 1981) (noting that Third World states, supported by
the socialist countries, won international recognition of the principle of self-
determination).
82. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1 para. 2. One of the purposes of the United Nations is to
develop friendly relations among nations and to strengthen universal peace. Id.
83. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (giving examples of subsequent
international declarations reaffirming the principle of self-determination).
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Nations General Assembly recognized the inalienable right of all peo-
ples to complete freedom.84 In 1966, the leading covenants on human
rights reaffirmed that all peoples have the right of self-determination. 8
The principle of self-determination is a defining characteristic of
Free State. It provides a moral and legal basis to repudiate all forms of
external subjugation, such as colonialism. In the past few decades
many new states have sprouted in regions previously occupied by colo-
nial powers.86 Despite the criticism that colonized regions such as the
Arabian peninsula or the Indian subcontinent have been "unjustly" di-
vided, inhabitants of newly founded nation-states jealously guard their
territorial boundaries and political independence.87 There appears to be
a universal attachment to the idea of the nation-state, and people in
almost all parts of the world celebrate their national independence with
profound emotions, patriotism, flags, and national anthems. 8  Arguably,
in view of such widespread nationalism, the principle of self-determina-
tion has bolstered the Grotian notion of territorial sovereignty, not
weakened it.
This argument, however, is deceptive: it conceals the schism between
the Grotian theory and the principle of self-determination. The Grotian
sovereign does not derive his authority from the people, nor is he ac-
countable to them. 9 The territorial sovereign is not tied to any particu-
84. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, para. 1, Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at
66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) (declaring that the foreign subjugation, domination and
exploitation of one people by another people constitutes a violation of fundamental
human rights).
85. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (declaring that all people
have the right to self-determination); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (same).
86. See supra note 72 (giving examples of nation-states that have emerged from
previously occupied colonial regions).
87. The celebration by Kuwaitis on the liberation of Kuwait, for example, shows
that the idea of creating one Arab nation may not be a practical goal. Many efforts to
unite the Arabian region have failed. Similarly, on the Indian subcontinent, the emer-
gence of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as independent nation-states demonstrates the
aspirations of the people to found nation-states. This partition of historical regions may
be a necessary dialectical step for moving toward Free State, which reaffirms unity
through the principle of self-determination rather than unity through coercion or his-
torical inertia.
88. W. FRIEDMAN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 35-36
(1964) The proliferation of sovereignties is a product of the era of decolonization. Id.
89. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. I, ch. III, § VIII, para. 1. The sovereign's
power is not subject to the legal control of another sovereign, and his actions cannot be
invalidated by the operation of another human will. Ido at § VII, para 1. The common
subject of sovereignty is the state, not the people. Id. at para. 2. There is nothing
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lar people, or for that matter to any people. The Grotian theory turned
the King of the French into the King of France. In fact, Grotius argued
that "the peoples who have passed under the sway of another people..
. are not in themselves a state." 90 Such "inferior people", he stated, are
equivalent to slaves in a household.9" If people who have once been
conquered or subdued strive for independence, he declared, "they act
like desperadoes and not like lovers of liberty." 92 Nothing in his theory,
therefore, allows the people under external subjugation to struggle for
their freedom and self-determination.9
3
Contrary to Grotian theory, Free State subordinates territorial sover-
eignty to the principle of self-determination. Hence, Free State rejects
the legitimacy of colonial rule and alien domination, even if such exter-
nal subjugation is efficacious.94 Because subjugated people have the
right to free their territory from alien rule, 5 Free State spurns sover-
wrong, Grotius argued, with a territorial sovereign heading several distinct peoples. Id.
at para. 3.
90. Id. at para. 2.
91. See id. at § VIII, para. 1 (reasoning that a man can enslave himself to a
master, so a people can submit themselves to a person, thus transfer the "legal right to
govern").
92. Id. at bk. II, ch. IV, § XIV, para. 1 (noting a remark made by King Agrippa to
the Zealots who clamored for liberty after being overcome).
93. Id. at bk. I, ch. IV. Although Grotius rejects as a general rule any right to
revolution against the territorial sovereign, he recognizes some right to resistance under
limited circumstances. For example, the people may resist a sovereign who has the
hostile intent to commit genocide. Id. at § XI. They may also wage war against a
usurper who has seized power unlawfully and "not in accordance with the law of na-
tions." Id. at § XVI. One may expand these exceptions to argue that Grotius would
have recognized a right to revolution against unjust alien sovereigns, but such an inter-
pretative magnification reads too much into the Grotian theory.
In contrast to Grotian theory, the principles of international law generally accepted
by the international community confer upon the people under racist regimes or other
forms of alien domination a "right to struggle" and to seek and receive support for
gaining independence. See Legal Consequences of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 (Advisory Opinion of June
21) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on Namibia] (finding that developments in interna-
tional law have led to the principle that self-determination and independence are the
ultimate objectives of non-self-governing peoples). Such armed struggle would not con-
stitute aggression ordinarily prohibited under the United Nations Charter. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 (declaring that suppression of acts of aggression is one of the
principle purposes of the United Nations). This right to struggle against colonial, racist
and alien sovereigns, even if their control over the territory and the coercive machinery
of the state is efficacious, weakens the Grotian conception of territorial sovereignty.
94. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 188 (1977). The right to self-determination should be available to all
subject peoples including ethnic and religious minorities. See V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD COMMUNITY 77-78 (1970) (stating that the
champions of self-determination may tend to ignore the rights of the minorities).
95. See Advisory Opinion on Namibia, supra note 93 and accompanying text (not-
ing that principles of international law confer upon the people under certain forms of
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eigns who claim legitimacy merely on the basis of effective control of
territory. Until the occupied people exercise their right of self-determi-
nation, their territory remains separate and distinct from the territory
of the occupying state.9 6
Although Free State rejects all forms of foreign domination, it never-
theless tolerates territorial sovereignty in exceptional cases. Foreign oc-
cupiers, for example, may claim temporary dominion during the brief
period when occupied territories evolve from subjugation to indepen-
dence. Such exceptions to the right of self-determination, however, are
subject to abuse. Therefore, the theory of Free State requires that the
territorial population demonstrate by some verifiable method, such as a
plebiscite, a clear willingness to accept such temporary foreign rule.9 7
Even in these cases, however, occupying sovereigns derive their tempo-
rary legitimacy not from control of the occupied territory, but from the
consent of the occupied people.98
Although Free State champions the right of self-determination, it re-
pudiates armed struggle and suspiciously views any use of violence as a
means to seek freedom.99 The principles of contemporary international
law recognize the right of the people under racist regimes or other
forms of alien domination to struggle, and to seek and receive support
alien domination a right to struggle and to seek and receive support for gaining inde-
pendence); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-33 (Advisory Opinion of Oct. 16) (cit-
ing the Advisory Opinion on Namibia to support its conclusion that non-self-governing
peoples have a right to seek self-determination).
96. See Declaration On Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doe. A/8082
(1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles] (re-
affirming the commitment of United Nations members to equal rights and self-determi-
nation without outside interference for all peoples).
97. The Indian province of Kashmir would act as an appropriate place to imple-
ment such a plebiscite. See Three Wars Fought Over Province, Chicago Tribune, May
29, 1991, at CIO (discussing Kashmir, a territory under the control of predominantly
Hindu India but with a predominantly Muslim population where three wars have been
fought over the issue of self-determination). Right now, the territory of Kashmir is
divided between India and Pakistan. A plebiscite would be one peaceful solution to
resolve this dispute.
98. See generally Wilkie, Moment of Hope After Decades of War and Despair,
Boston Globe, July 23, 1991, at 1 (examining the long history of Israeli-Palestinian
conflicts over the West Bank and Gaza Strip in light of the recent Middle East Peace
Conference prospects).
99. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 93 and accompanying text. Thus, the right to
struggle sanctioned by Free State is distinguishable from the right to armed struggle
recognized in contemporary international law. The right to armed struggle against co-
lonial, racist and alien sovereigns has been recognized even though aggression is gener-
ally prohibited under the United Nations Charter. Id.
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for gaining independence.100 This right to struggle against external sub-
jugation is important. Nonetheless, Free State does not interpret this
right to excuse or justify any acts of armed aggression or terrorism. In
fact, Free State rejects all forms of violence. Following the principles of
the United Nations Charter, a fully developed Free State will
strengthen universal peace and promote friendship among the peoples
of the world.' 01 Even in its formative stage, Free State remains pacifist:
it abhors war and refrains in its international relations from the threat
or use of force.'0 2 While the right to "armed" struggle may be lawfully
invoked to found a nation-state, the establishment of a Free State can-
not justify such violence. The right of self-determination is an essential
attribute of Free State only when this right is exercised through peace-
ful means.
B. FREEDOM FROM INTERNAL SUBJUGATION
The moral and legal environment of human rights altered that char-
acteristic of the Grotian state which divested the people from the ulti-
mate source of governmental power.10 3 For many centuries, questions
regarding forms of government remained matters of domestic concern,
outside the reach and scrutiny of international law. In fact, interna-
tional law recognized that a state was "free to organize itself as it sees
fit."' x This freedom, however, belonged to the state. The people did
not have an international right to demand any particular form of gov-
ernment. Consequently, international law legally accepted even cruel
and unjust governments. Early in the nineteenth century, Chief Justice
John Marshall of the United States Supreme Court articulated the
Grotian idea of territorial sovereignty, reporting that sovereignty of a
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.10 5
Any exceptions to such all-encompassing power, said Marshall, may
100. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, art. 7, G.A. Res. 3314, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M.
710 (1978) (stating that nothing in the United Nations' definition of aggression in any
way affects the right of self-determination, especially of peoples under colonial or racist
regimes); Declaration of Principles, supra note 96 and accompanying text (declaring
that states pursuing self-determination are entitled to receive support in accordance
with the principles of the Charter).
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
102. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
103. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. 1, ch. 11I, § VIII, para. 1.
104. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Inter-American), art. 3. 49
Stat. 3097, 3100, T.S. No. 881, at 3, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25 (entered into force, Dec. 26,
1.934).
105. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116. 136 (1812).
1992]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
find the consent from the nation itself because they can flow from no
other legitimate source.106
One may argue that international law, through an evolutionary pro-
cess, has suppressed the absolute form of territorial sovereignty by cre-
ating a normative order that states can no longer revoke at their free
will. The sovereign right of a state to do as it pleases within its own
territory is now greatly reduced. Furthermore, even though states may
still have the power to ignore many international obligations, they no
longer enjoy the absolute sovereignty to derogate from all principles of
international law. On the contrary, certain norms of international law
exist from which no state has the lawful authority to derogate. 0
The law of human rights, for example, places important limitations
on the sovereignty of a nation- state within its own territory. Such limi-
tations may have already been placed by some internal higher law such
as a national constitution. 1 8 The international law of human rights,
however, constitutes a distinct authority that acts to limit claims of ab-
solute domestic sovereignty. No nation-state, for example, may claim a
sovereign right to commit genocide within its territory. 0 9 Similarly, no
nation-state may invoke any moral or legal basis rooted in any concept
of territorial sovereignty to institute slavery. 10 In fact, all nation-states
agree to a general international consensus that each protect a broad
spectrum of human rights. Any assertion that a government has the
sovereign right to abuse its citizens has lost its legitimacy.
106. Id.
107. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, arts. 53 & 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344, 347, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at 289
(1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 698, 703 (1969) (articulating the doctrine of pre-
emptory norms which mandate that states may not enter into any agreement in viola-
tion of basic international law standards).
108. See U.S. CoNsT. (protecting certain fundamental rights and freedoms of
United States citizens).
109. See Convention on the Prevention of Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (denouncing genocide as an "odious scourge" that all
nations must seek to prevent and punish). This convention, making genocide a crime
under international law, seems to have become customary international law.See L.
HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 21 (1990) [hereinafter AGE OF RIGHTS] (stating that
after forty years of international human rights activity culminating in a series of widely
held pledges, acts such as genocide, slavery, or torture are banned by customary inter-
national law).
110. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, G.A. Res. 217 (III), 3 (1)
U.N. GAOR at 71, Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 85, at art. 8; Vienna Convention, supra note 107, at arts. 53 & 64.
Prohibition against slavery has become a peremptory rule of international law. See
AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 21 (stating that acts such as slavery, torture or




In accordance with the law of human rights, Free State requires that
governments derive their legitimacy, as well as their authority, from
the people."1' Free State grants the people freedom from internal tyr-
anny and subjugation. In order to fully understand the democratic na-
ture of Free State, it might be helpful to first review the character of
the Grotian state.
Grotius made several arguments to justify internal domination of the
sovereign. He asserted that the right to sovereignty should not be con-
fused with any preferred form of government.11 2 Grotius also asserted
that the people's consent should not be a prerequisite to a right to sov-
ereignty."13 Grotius argued that even though people in certain regimes
had retained the authority to form a government,' 4 it does not follow
that the legal right to sovereignty in every other regime must also be
conditioned upon popular sovereignty." 5 Nations may institute un-
democratic forms of government." 6 A kingship under which the sover-
eign is not answerable to the people is as valid as any other form of
government."' Many nations, he asserted, existed for centuries under
monarchs."'
This conceptual wedge between the right to sovereignty and the form
of government was designed to disentangle the sovereign from the peo-
ple. The separation of the people from the sovereign was a great schol-
arly artifice to root the concept of sovereignty within the boundaries of
a defined territory.
Grotius makes a descriptive argument. He takes this analytical ap-
proach to discredit popular reasoning which confused "what sover-
eignty is" with "what sovereignty ought to be." Grotius recognized,
without any normative criticism, that in reality all forms of government
are not based on the popular will."19
111. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85, at
art. 25 (recognizing the right of every citizen to vote at genuine periodic elections
based on universal and equal suffrage); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 110, at art. 21 (proclaiming that the will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government).
112. See H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. 1, ch. III, § VIII, para. 2 (explaining
that the right to sovereignty should not depend upon the relative excellence of a partic-
ular form of government).
113. Id. at paras. 6 & 7.
114. Id. at para. 2.
115. Id. at paras. 1 & 2.
116. Id. at paras. 3 & 10-12.
117. See id. at paras. 10 & 11 (embellishing Aristotle's theory on the king's rela-
tionship to the people and his right to sovereignty).
118. Id. at para 5.
119. Id. at para 3.
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Grotius further justified internal domination of the sovereign by
questioning the notion that all governments were established for the
welfare of the people.'2 0 Moreover, Grotius prohibited the people from
challenging the acts and policies of the sovereign. Although Grotius
recognized some right to resistance under limited circumstances,12' he
rejected as a general rule any right to revolt against the territorial
sovereign."'
This severance of the ruler from the ruled implied that the sovereign
required the people to obey if they disagreed with him. Grotius warned
that acting otherwise would introduce disorder. 2 3 The immorality of a
sovereign act did not justify disobedience to the sovereign. 24
One may argue that Grotius correctly adopted neutrality toward
forms of government. Even today, many different forms of government
exist. Some states have democratic governments, others have dictator-
ships, and still others have kingships. This diversity of government may
reflect cultural plurality and may even find justification under the prin-
ciple of political independence enshrined in the United Nations Char-
ter. 2 ' Grotian neutrality, however, poses dangers to human rights.
Under a neutral conception of territorial sovereignty, the principle of
political independence allows each state to institute a form of govern-
ment according to its sociopolitical needs and cultural imperatives. This
interpretation, however, does not mandate that each state institute
some popular form of government. In fact, the principle of political
independence justifies even cruel regimes that violate fundamental
human rights.'26 Under this interpretation, moreover, the question of
how a government treats its people shifts from international concern to
120. Id. at para. 14. "It is not universally true," Grotius stated, "that all govern-
ment was constituted for the benefit of the governed." Id.
121. See id. at bk. 1, ch. IV, § XI (stating that the people have the right to resist a
sovereign who intends to commit genocide). They may also wage war against a usurper
who has seized power unlawfully and "not in accordance with the law of nations." Id.
at § XVI.
One may expand these exceptions to argue that Grotius would have recognized a
right to revolution against unjust alien sovereigns, but such an interpretative magnifica-
tion of the Grotian theory is unwarranted.
122. See id. at § II, para. 1 (noting that the right of unrestrained resistance would
lead to a state's dissolution).
123. Id. at bk. 1, ch. III, § IX, para. 1.
124. Id.
125. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I (stating that the United Nations is based
upon the sovereign equality of all states).
126. See generally, Khan, A Legal Theory of Revolutions, 5 BOSTON UNIV. INT'L
L. J. 1, 12 (1987) (criticizing Grotius' notion of sovereignty which denies that govern-
ment necessarily exists for the sake of the governed, and finding the notion unaccept-
able under a stated principle of human rights).
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the domestic jurisdiction of each nation-state. Consequently, the princi-
ple of political independence acts to justify suppressive dictatorships
and totalitarian legal orders.
Free State rejects all descriptive and normative arguments that jus-
tify the internal subjugation of the people. It requires that the will of
the people sustain the authority of the government. Thus, Free State
reestablishes the concept of popular sovereignty that Grotius discarded.
Accordingly, Free State protects the political independence of the peo-
ple within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Additionally, it inter-
prets the principle of political independence in the context of human
rights and recognizes that all peoples have the right to "freely deter-
mine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development. 1' 27 Free State shifts the focus of international
law from the state to the people and interweaves human rights into the
basics of political independence.
In Free State, the people have the right to freely determine their
political status and to structure domestic institutions in order to fulfill
their unique cultural and socioeconomic aspirations. While Free State
affords people these rights, it does not require that all domestic institu-
tions in each state be the same. Moreover, Free State does not approve
only those forms of government in which the people elect the chief ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies. Even constitutional monarchies and king-
ships can be instituted according to the will of the people.
Free State asserts that no one superior form of government exists.
Nonetheless, Free State disclaims those forms of government which
lack the legal mechanisms to respond to the popular will. Only a gov-
ernment system that periodically ascertains popular will qualifies as
Free State. For example, a periodic referendum to test the validity of a
royal government may be fully compatible with popular sovereignty. In
comparison, any government which initially submits itself to the people,
but which provides no method for its removal, fails to meet the require-
ments of popular sovereignty. Even though a government that provides
no legal method for its removal may be benevolent, Free State requires
even that government to show that it continues to enjoy the support of
the people.128 Free State finds offensive any form of government in
which the people have no right to remove the sovereign. In contrast,
Grotius argued that a people threatened with destruction or in dire
127. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
85.
128. See Khan, supra note 126, at 22-23 (concluding that rcvolutions only acquire
legitimacy if the people approve the succession rules).
1992]
220 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 7:197
need of life-sustaining supplies may wholly renounce the right to gov-
ern themselves.
1 29
More importantly to the Free State, human rights are transforming
the Grotian concept of territorial sovereignty by anchoring it in the
needs and aspirations of the people. °30 The Grotian theory of sovereign
state imposed no duty on the sovereign to act for the benefit of the
people. 131 Government officials could appropriate state power and re-
sources to aggrandize their personal fortunes, and a government could
"have in view only the advantage of him who governs."'3 2 In light of
the universal recognition of human rights, however, most states now
assume moral and legal duties to protect the welfare of the people.'
Human rights law imposes on a sovereign an internationally recognized
normative obligation to advance the welfare of its subjects. 34
In contrast to the Grotian state, Free State accepts its normative
obligation to protect fundamental human rights. 3 5 It forbids the gov-
129. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. 1, ch. III, § VIII, para. 3. History shows,
however, that a people so threatened may eventually fare poorly because they have no
legal mechanism to remove unacceptable sovereigns.
130. See D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny,
84 Am. J. INT'L L. 516, 517 (1990) (projecting that United States actions in Panama
and Grenada may represent the new order by advancing human rights through military
intervention). Professor D'Amato supports intervention in another state to promote the
development of human rights. See id. at 516 (announcing that the United States inter-
vention in Panama produced positive results for human rights). See also Weston, The
Role of Law in Promoting Peace and Violence: A Matter of Definition, Social Values,
and Individual Responsibility in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 114-
15 (1976) (stating that the individual is the ultimate actor, and to suggest otherwise
would be to misconceive the true architects of social justice and injustice).
131. See GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. 1, ch. III, § VIII. para. 14 (conceding,
however, that most sovereigns guard and work for the benefit of their people).
132. See id. (supporting the view that the master exercises his authority to further
his own power to the detriment of his servant).
133. See infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text (providing examples of how
states attempt to protect citizens).
134. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 85 (declaring that everyone may enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights supra note 85 (proclaiming that
everyone should enjoy civil and political freedom); and Optional Protocol to Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967) (creating a
Human Rights Committee to receive communications from victims of civil and political
rights violations within parties to the Optional Protocol).
135. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra
note 85, at arts. 6-12 (requiring that parties provide the right to work at a chosen
profession, under safe conditions, the right to form trade unions, the right to social
security, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health).
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ernment from violating civil and political rights of the people."38 It ac-
cepts the mandate that governments employ their maximum available
sources to construct a socioeconomic system under which individuals
enjoy meaningful employment, an adequate standard of living, and
proper physical and mental health.13 Accordingly, no person acting in
an official capacity may violate these rights, 3 8 and all state institutions
136. See Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 85 (declaring that signatories recognize the individual dignity of each per-
son). Signatories assume the responsibility to safeguard the liberty and security of the
person against random deprivation of life, torture, forced labor, arbitrary arrest and
invasion of privacy. Id. at arts. 6, 7, 8, 9 & 17, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 370-71, 373. In
addition, signatories undertake to create a legal environment that ensures the freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; the freedom of expression; and the freedom of asso-
ciation with others. Id. at arts. 18-22, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 374 (ensuring that signato-
ries observe the right to adopt a religion, the right to freedom of speech and press, and
the right to peaceful assembly).
137. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 85, at arts. 2 & 6-12, 6 I.L.M. 361-64 (explaining that signatories undertake
many obligations to respect the rights of its citizens). In order to live meaningful and
dignified lives, individuals need some sort of security against hunger, homelessness,
epidemics, occupational diseases, unemployment, unjust and unsafe working conditions.
Signatories must affirmatively implement the rights, rather than merely enacting
human rights legislation. Id. Free State accepts these obligations. If it lacks sufficient
internal resources to realize its goals, Free State may seek international technical and
economic assistance to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of
food, to control epidemics and other diseases and to facilitate the provision of other
services. Signatories must freely and openly cooperate with one another as members of
a symbiotic international community. Id. Free State does not tolerate massive illiter-
acy, which disables populations from enjoying a prosperous and enlightened life. Access
to education is perhaps the most precious right, for it fosters a respect for human rights
and freedom. Id. at art. 13.
Education may not only empower individuals to participate effectively in a free soci-
ety, it may also promote understanding and harmony among racial, ethnic and religious
groups. Id. Education will advance peaceful objectives through the workings of the
United Nations. Id. Free State, therefore, undertakes to build an educational system
that encourages technical and vocational secondary education as well as higher educa-
tion, but under which fundamental education is compulsory and available free to all.
Id. Signatories must introduce "free education". Id.
Free State is not necessarily a rich state that has the resources to provide basic needs
of life to everyone. Even a poor state could be a Free State. Id. What distinguishes
Free State from others is its sincere commitment and persistent willingness to guide
socioeconomic forces towards actively achieving economic, social and cultural rights.
Id. at Preamble. Unlike the Grotian state that does not undertake any affirmative obli-
gation to work for the benefit of the people, Free State is firmly anchored in the virtue
of human rights. Signatories must promote human rights. Id. Free State does not toler-
ate a government that breaches its responsibility to preserve and promote the good of
all the people. It confers no legitimacy on any sovereign who denies his moral duty to
uphold all covenants of human rights that Free State has made with the people and the
world.
138. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85, at
art. 2, 6 I.L.M. at 369 (stating that a victim of a rights violation enjoys a remedy
against even an official who acts in an official capacity).
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must adopt such legislative or other measures necessary for the en-
forcement of these rights.1
3 9
The fact that many states have not yet firmly committed to protect
human rights may reflect the continued validity of the Grotian the-
ory. 140 Even among the states that have assumed such an obligation,
many lack laudable human rights records.' 4 1 Therefore, some argue,
the Grotian sovereign is not extinct.'14 This argument confuses a simple
distinction. Although a state violates human rights, such violation fails
to make the action lawful.' 43 The breach of an obligation does not
prove its absence. On the contrary, once a state accepts the commit-
ment to protect and promote human rights, it ipso facto modifies its
Grotian character and relinquishes its power to ignore or violate those
rights. 44 This remarkable moral and legal evolution even modifies the
139. Id.
140. See D. Weissbrodt, Ways International Organizations Can Improve Their Im-
plementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Con-
flict, in NEW DIRECTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS 69 (1989) [hereinafter Weissbrodt] (ac-
knowledging that many governments have not signed the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights).
141. See AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 109, at IX (allowing that the consensus on
international rights "is at best formal, or nominal and perhaps even hypocritical and
cynical"); See also Dowrick, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS, PERSPEC-
TIVES AND TEXTS 2-3 (1979) (reviewing some states' assumed international human
rights obligations and their alleged violations).
142. See AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 13 (noting the struggle between states
seeking to exercise autonomous control over their affairs and the international human
rights concern for individual welfare).
143. See id. at 21 (emphasizing that the growing body of human rights obligations
in the twentieth century forces states to recognize human rights in their laws and
practices).
144. See AGE OF RIGHTS, supra, note 109, at 6-7 (declaring that international
human rights obligations preclude the government from abusing civil and political
rights and modify the government's conduct). Many states have not signed important
human rights instruments. For example, many states have not ratified the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and even fewer states have approved the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. See Weissbrodt, supra note 140, at 68 (citing that
as of December 31, 1986, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 was
ratified by 83 states and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was
accepted by 86 states). Nonetheless, more than half the states in the world have as-
sumed a legal obligation to enforce these basic covenants. See M. McDougal, H. Cass-
well & W. Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Configurative
Jurisprudence, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 45 (1981) [hereinafter Theories About
International Law] (announcing that most people recognize that everyone enjoys at
least the right to a "dignified human existence"). Furthermore, there is a universal
moral consensus that some protection of fundamental human rights is binding on all
states. See AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 19 (explaining that some people argue
that the United Nations Charter and its pledges supporting human rights developed
customary law of human rights binding on all states). See also McKay, What Next? in
HUMAN DIGNITY: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (1979) [herein-
after HUMAN DIGNITY] (contending that all nations recognize a few well established
principles of human rights). Perhaps no state would openly declare that it has no legal
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nature of the Grotian sovereign who assumes no obligation to
subordinate his own interests to the benefit of the people.14
Leading international lawyers disagree on whether foreign interven-
tion is lawful when the political apparatus of a state violates the princi-
ple of self-determination or when that apparatus is ruthlessly oppres-
sive. Professor Reisman, for example, argues against mechanically
interpreting the standards of territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence so that deposing a despotic regime appears indistinguishable
from overthrowing popular governments.1 46 Professor Schachter, in
obligation whatsoever to protect any rights of the people. See AGE OF RiGHTS, supra
note 109, at X (analyzing that states recognize human rights as commonplace and
condemn government's that do not). See also Wilson, A Bedrock Consensus of Human
Rights, in HUMAN DIGNITY at 55 (acknowledging that no government, as part of offi-
cial policy, denie rights to its citizens). All parties to the United Nations Charter have
accepted the obligation to protect and promote human rights. See U.N. CHARTER art.
1, para. 3 (stating that the Charter's purpose is to promote the advancement of human
rights); Id at art. 55 (commanding global attention to the respect for human rights);
Id. at art. 68 (establishing an authority to set up commissions for the promotions of
human rights).
145. See Hannum, The Limits of Sovereignty and Majority Rule: Minorities, In-
digenous Peoples, and the Right to Autonomy, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS 5-6 (1989) [hereinafter Limits of Sovereignty] (realizing that the increase in
the multilateral economic and political treaties regulate sovereigns' behavior). Hannum
stresses that although the United Nations and the European Community promote sov-
ereign equality among the states, they also reduced the states' ability to freely and
individually act. Id. Unpopular and ideological sovereigns suppress freedoms of the
people to maintain their control over a dissatisfied, and perhaps defiant, population that
challenges the legitimacy of the sovereign. See A.H. Robertson, The European Comen-
tion on Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 99-
100 (1967) (asserting that tyrannical regimes deny human rights pursuant to their own
constitutions and policies); see also R. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 1978 4 (1978) (describing that incumbent leaders deny
human rights in order to prevent the populace from asserting its criticisms and com-
plaints against the regime). Such sovereigns can become outright cruel if there is no
legal mechanism to oust them from power. See D'Amato, supra note 154, at 519 (sig-
naling that cruel regimes frequently control the access to arms, and in turn, use this
power to suppress their own people). Ideological sovereigns deny people their civil and
political rights, including the right to assemble and dissent, because they do not toler-
ate any criticism of their form of government, of their socioeconomic goals, and partic-
ularly of the ideology that they have imposed on the people. See Montgomery, The
Marxist Approach to Human Rights: Analysis and Critique, SIMON GREENLEAF L.
REV. 3 (1983-84) (listing repeated human rights violations as repression of political
and ideological dissent among others). Irrespective of their actual motives, almost all
suppressive sovereigns tend to justify the denial of these rights in the name of some
higher good such as economic development of the people. See Gastil at 4 (criticizing
that the modernization of Iran under the Shah succeeded due to the state's suppression
of the media, free speech, and religion).
146. See Reisman, Coercion and Self Determination: Construing Charter Article
2(4), 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 642, 644 (1984) (advocating that the interpretation of article
2(4) depends on the spirit of protecting political independence sometimes at the ex-
pense of territorial sovereignty). The intention behind the language of the rule, and not
the language per se, should control. Id. Professor Reisman highlights the hypocrisy in
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contrast, warns that Professor Reisman's interpretation dangerously
weakens the normative restraint against the use of force.14
Little comfort exists in choosing between conflicting interpretations
of the principles of political independence and territorial integrity. Pro-
fessor Reisman's policy-oriented exceptions to territorial sovereignty14 8
provide no guidance to rule upon the legitimacy of many excuses that
states have used 14 9 to violate the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of another state. Even if some Dworkinian Hercules could
understand the normative complexity of a disputed intervention or in-
vasion. These policy-oriented justifications would serve only global or
denying intervention to overthrow a despotic, unpopular government and providing for-
eign aid to repressive regimes. See id. at 645 (asserting that this interpretation of arti-
cle 2(4) "rapes common sense").
147. See Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
645 (1984) (countering that Professor Reisman's interpretation trivializes the distinc-
tion between aggression and self-protection). Professor Schachter fears that the use of
force for a "good cause" will lead to the use of force in a bad cause. See id. at 647
(articulating Professor Reisman's interpretation of article 2(4) as destructive to the
maintenance of peace).
148. See Reisman, supra note 146, at 644 (advocating that article 2(4) provides for
the use of force by another state to oust "despotism").
149. See Schachter, supra note 147, at 648 (emphasizing that democratic states,
particularly the United States, have used a range of pretexts to justify their interven-
tions). See also, How the Invasion of Panama Affects International Law and the Baha-
mas, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1990, at 1 (citing that Israel launched operations in Uganda to
rescue hostages); Grossfeld, Ethiopian Jews Are Embraced by the New Israeli Home-
land, Boston Globe, July 25, 1991, at 16 (comparing Israel's emotional state after the
airlift of Ethiopian Jews to its patriotic fervor following the rescue of its citizens from
Entebbe in 1976). The United States invaded Grenada to "protect nationals" from
injury. See Leigh, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 655, 664 (1984) (comments by David Robinson, Legal
Advisor of Dep't of State) (stating that the United States considered 1,000 United
States citizens as threatened by conditions in Grenada). Vietnam invaded Cambodia to
end "genocidal atrocities." See Schanberg, The U.S. Beat the Lesser of Two Evils,
Newsday, March 1, 1991, at 101 (discussing that Pol Pot of the Khmer Rouge com-
mitted "genocidal atrocities" in Cambodia prior to Vietnam's takeover in 1979). The
Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia to "save socialism." See Butturini, To Czechos-
lovaks, '68 Invasion Just Old News, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 21, 1988, at 6 (indicating
that the Soviet Union justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia to "save socialism" from
"rightists" who attempted to overthrow the communist system). India invaded East
Pakistan to stop "military atrocities." See Hazarkia, Bangladesh Insurgents Say India
is Supporting Them, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, at 3, col. 3 (relaying that there was a
war between India and Pakistan, of which East Pakistan was a part, in 1971 following
the exodus of 10 million Pakistanis distraught over the Pakistani military's abusive
behavior). Iraq invaded Kuwait to oust "corrupt rulers." See Inside Iraq: Amid the
Ruins, Fear, Anger and Cynicism, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1991, at 3, col. 4 (reciting
that Iraq intended to "chase all corrupt rulers from Arab lands.").
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regional superpowers. °50 In fact, weaker states become more vulnerable
once exceptions to the principle of non-intervention arise.'1
Professor Schachter's reluctance to allow any foreign intervention, in
contrast, appears to shield vicious governments. International stoicism
resulting in absolute non-intervention becomes a moral mistake when
state tyranny is incessant and massive.152 A total ban on foreign inter-
vention favors upholding abstract legal concepts at the expense of
human suffering.'53
Free State rejects the debate between upholding territorial sover-
eignty and allowing humanitarian intervention.'" These normative con-
tradictions and nagging dilemmas arise from the lingering legitimacy
of the Grotian theory. Free State repudiates the Grotian system.
Equally important, it rejects the threat or use of force in the manage-
ment of global affairs. The concept of human rights embodies Free
State. Free State rejects all forms of subjugation and aggression, inter-
nal as well as external.
150. See Schachter, supra note 147, at 649 (predicting that Professor Reisman's
reinterpretation of article 2(4)'s use of force would authorize powerful states to impose
their will over governments that ignore the views of their own people).
151. See id. at 650 (fearing that powerful states will abuse the use of force from
article 2(4) under the pretense of self-determination or self-defense).
152. See Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 Abs. J. IrL L. 494,
511 (1990) (conceding that arguments that support the legitimacy of the sovereignty
can appear morally repulsive).
153. See Reisman, supra note 146, at 645 (claiming that a mechanical interpreta-
tion of article 2(4) may gravely deprive a large population of its human rights).
154. See Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under In-
ternational Law, 84 AMi. J. Ir'L L. 494, 500 (1990) (advocating that the United
States invasion of Panama was not justified by norms of international law); Farer,
supra note 152, at 504 (1990) (asserting that the United Nations Charter does not
recognize the defense or rescue of United States nationals in Panama as a basis for
United States intervention in Panama); D'Amato, supra note 130, at 519, 520 (1990)
(maintaining that protecting citizens from a tyrannical leader may justify interven-
tion). Like Grotius, Professor Nanda makes a realistic but normatively empty argu-
ment that the will of the people is not always recognized as the basis of governmental
authority. See Nanda, 84 Ati. J. INr'L L. at 500 (voicing that the United Nations does
not equate self-determination with the will of the people). Professor Farer also defends
the Grotian concept of sovereignty. See Farer, supra note 154, at 507 (declaring that
one state may not impose its will upon the occupants of another). Professor D'Amato,
however, rejects this "statist" concept of international law. See D'Amato, supra note
154, at 520 (explaining that intervention and use of force comply with article 2(4)
when the action does not harm the "territorial integrity" of the country through annex-
ation or colonization).
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V. FREEDOM FROM BOUNDARIES
New forces of human rights, 15 5 commerce 158 and technology' 57 have
interwoven all nation-states, large and small, into an intricate, ines-
capable web of interdependence. 58 Not even the mightiest state can
survive outside the global network. Willful sovereigns following isola-
tionist policies risk catastrophic seclusion. 159 In fact, the recent eco-
nomic quarantine of Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait demonstrates that
isolation from the international community is a serious punishment. 60
Thus, even if the partition of the planet into existing nation-states per-
sists, global interdependence will frustrate any meaningful application
of territorial sovereignty.'' Hence, the nation-state will be increasingly
obliged to mutate into Free State.
For centuries, national boundaries have separated and confined the
peoples of the world. 8 2 Innumerable factors may explain this fragmen-
tation of the human family. Racial, linguistic, religious and ethnic dif-
ferences, for example, are historic barriers which breed ill-will, hostility
155. See AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 13-14 (referring to the "international-
ization of human rights.").
156. See Theories About International Law, supra note 144, at 45 (indicating how
interdependence among nation-states becomes apparent through their pursuit of
wealth). Economic stability requires markets beyond a state's borders, and disruption
affects all links in the economic chain. Id.
157. See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Sys-
tems of Public Order, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 27 (1981) (intimating that new
developments in technology, such as space and planetary exploration, machine simula-
tions of the brain, development of contraceptive devices, and experimental embryology
force drastic revisions of fundamental ideas, including the scope and reach of interna-
tional law).
158. See Theories About International Law, supra note 144, at 44 (arguing that
international trade per se confirms interdependence among nations).
159. See id. at 44-45 (proposing that global interaction has forced every individual
to think globally not locally).
160. See Twelve Months Later, The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 2, 1991, at
20 (reporting that the economic sanctions against Iraq were punishing). See also,
Charmelot, Iraq Has Limited Sovereignty Since Gulf War, Agence France Presse, July
28, 1991 (citing that the United Nations enjoyed what one diplomat here calls a
"quasi-mandate" as it enforced resolutions regarding the economic embargo, which
causes famine and malnutrition among Iraq's population); Flanigan, Eventually Iraq
Will Be One Hot Business Prospect, L.A. Times, July 28, 1991, at DI (describing that
Iraq is bankrupt, with no oil revenues, $4 billion in frozen accounts, and depleted for-
eign reserves of $14 million).
161. See Limits of Sovereignty, supra note 145, at 7 (stressing that the state still
acts as a buffer among the world's military powers, but acknowledging that interna-
tional organizations also influence the state).
162. See generally A. COBBAN, THE NATION-STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETER-




and even hatred between groups and populations.10 3 Instituting itself as
the raison d'etre of such human distinctions, the nation-state perpetu-
ates these barriers.164 The nation-state maintains physical borders to
restrict the free flow of goods, services and persons. It also establishes
psychological boundaries to repress the free flow of human goodwill.' 63
The segmentation of the world seems to have run its course. 6 ' Numer-
ous scientific, economic, geographical and normative developments
challenge traditional boundaries of the nation-state.10 7 Moreover, senti-
ments of cooperation and universal realization of interdependence
weaken national identities.' 68 Recognizing the dysfunctional nature of
the nation-state, Free State liberates people from both physical and
psychological boundaries of the nation-state.
A. FREEDOM FROM PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES
Freedom from physical boundaries is the hallmark of Free State.
Several new developments support the emergence of Free State by
challenging the practical significance of national borders. 6 9 These in-
clude the advance of science and technology, the raised consciousness
of humankind's role in nature, the interdependent global economy, and
the new emphasis on the freedom of international movement.
First, science and technology have in many ways rendered borders
dysfunctional.170 The radiation released in the Chernobyl accident, for
example, swept over Europe, fluttered across the Pacific Ocean, and
163. See generally, Limits of Sovereignty, supra note 145, at 6 (arguing that these
differences prompted various groups to implement their views by controlling political
channels).
164. See id. at 7 (predicting that the validity of the nation-state will continue, al-
though Hannum desires a more flexible notion of state sovereignty).
165. See AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 47 (formulating that states lack a
social contract whenever the persons of one society refuse to accept political and legal
obligations of another society).
166. See Limits of Sovereignty, supra note 145, at 19 (asserting that while the
state is still the most significant legal actor, increasing international restrictions on
state activity reflect the growing interdependency of international order).
167. See id. (stressing that the nation-state ideal is now impracticable due to new
international restrictions on state sovereignty).
168. See id. (advocating that the interdependency of states will increasingly in-
fringe on state sovereignty, although predicting that sovereignty will persist).
169. See id. (heralding that the nation-state hampers the development of
interdependence).
170. Cleveland, The Internationalization of Internal Affairs, in HUMAN DIGNITY:
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHrS 44-55 (1979). The management of
scientific and high-technological endeavors in space and the deep seabed includes all
nations. Id.
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invaded the United States.' 71 Against such a phenomenon, state fron-
tiers are meaningless. Similarly, in commerce and banking, the rapid
transboundary electronic flow of financial data makes it difficult for
territorial sovereigns to regulate, for tax purposes, the precise situs of
funds.' 72 Space technology poses an equally formidable challenge to the
privacy and security of the nation-state. 73 Intrusive satellites orbiting
hundreds of miles above the earth can engage in remote sensing of the
earth's natural and man-made resources without regard to the bounda-
ries of nation-states.
74
Second, Free State promotes the universal principle that human civi-
lization is rooted in nature.17  Therefore, the seamless unity of nature
should not be denied in the name of artificial national boundaries.
Originally, a state's sovereignty over the airspace above its territory
was thought to extend usque ad coelum, '7 but recent scientific discov-
eries and the development of space technology exposed the impractica-
bility of enforcing such a conception. Even if nation-states can appor-
tion airspace, they cannot partition the incomprehensible horizons of
the universe.
Contemporary consciousness, rooted in egalitarian principles of uni-
versal rights and cooperation, gives new impetus to the concept that
certain things belong to all people. Grotius himself championed that
private ownership of the oceans and air can never occur. 17 This limit
on sovereignty has now extended to Antarctica,7 8 outer space, the
171. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law Regu-
lating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 203, 205 (1987). The radiation from Chernobyl spread to Norway, Finland,
Sweden and Europe and the United States. Id.
172. See Branscomb, Global Governance of Global Networks: A Survey of Trans-
border Data Flow in Transition, 36 VAND. L. REV. 985, 1006 (1983) (noting that the
international movement of financial data allows banks and other international business
institutions to escape national laws regulating and taxing money transactions). The un-
checked transboundary flow of funds also threatens the existence of national money
markets. See id. at 1006 (exclaiming that "banking institutions have threatened the
very existence of national money markets in their efforts to control national currencies
in the same international trade transactions that gave rise to the Eurodollar"). Approx-
imately one trillion dollars in investment capital, for example, have been found in a
stateless pool. Id.
173. See id. at 1007 (stating that the remote sensing of the earth from beyond its
borders raises concerns among the world's policy makers).
174. See id. at 1008 (describing that satellites can orbit 575 miles above the earth
and photograph less than 100 yards in size).
175. World Charter For Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at
21, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4 and Add. 1 (1982).
176. L. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 317.
177. H. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at bk. II, ch. II, § III, para. 1.
178. The Antarctic Treaty, June 23, 1961, art. IV (2), 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
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moon and other celestial bodies. 179 Although some states resist surren-
dering their egocentric view of the universe, an increasing moral and
legal consciousness builds to consider the planet as an indivisible natu-
ral and legal entity that must be used for the benefit of all. 8'
In addition, a broad moral consensus exists among members of the
international community to reorient the human-centric view of the uni-
verse, thereby discarding humankind's tendency to usurp the earth's
resources to the exclusion of other life forms.18' Excessive consumption
and misuse of natural resources degrade natural systems.' 82 Collective
life on earth suffers when each nation-state uses sovereignty to main-
tain a socioeconomic system that disregards the integrity of ecosystems
and organisms. To preserve endangered species, biological diversity,
and the earth's natural beauty, nation-states must cooperate to restrict
not only the human-centric interpretation of nature but also the divisive
concept of territorial sovereignty.'
83
Third, the global economy defies state borders that impede the flow
of goods, services, and persons. In the intertwined nature of the world
economy, a state can no longer confine its economy to national bounda-
ries; nor may a state command global economic forces. Market integra-
tion in the European Community highlights the trend towards sover-
eignties joining for mutual advantage. Similar cooperation in other
parts of the world will likely create an economic environment in which
regions, rather than nation-states, become the principle players in the
global market.""' Nation-states must substantially dismantle their bor-
ders to participate in regional economic communities. Thus, from such
regional communities will Free States first emerge. Nation-states
within the European Community, for example, are already mutating
179. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967.
arts. I & II, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967), reprinted in
6 I.L.M. 386 (1967).




184. See generally, Asia-Pacific Region Will Be One of Three Major Trade Cen-
ters in 1990s, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), No. 33, at 1275 (Aug. 15, 1990) (stating that
the Asia-Pacific Region, North America and European Community will be the three
major trade centers in the 1990's). The Free Trade Agreement between the United
States and Canada, and a possible joining of Mexico in the free trade zone would
create a formidable regional market in North America. Similarly, Pacific-rim countries
including Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand may create a consoli-
dated regional market. Id.
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into free states. 185 Through a similar process, it is likely that regional
free states will transform into global free states.
Fourth, the right to freedom of movement challenges territorial bor-
ders that obstruct the free flow of people. 186 Given modern means of
transportation and a willingness to relocate, thousands of people exer-
cise their right to leave their homes and settle in other countries. Be-
cause most nation-states control the movement of people, however,
many more are denied such freedom. Many countries prohibit their na-
tionals from leaving, and many forbid nationals of other states from
entering. Communist states, for example, restrict their citizens' right to
travel and immigrate. Prosperous states, on the other hand, possess
stringent laws against the inflow of peoples from poor countries. None-
theless, the right to freedom of movement will challenge the mainte-
nance of rigid physical boundaries and hinder nation-states' attempts to
arbitrarily deny the right to relocate.
18 7
Free State guarantees the right to freedom of movement. Nation-
states within the European Community are already mutating into free
states. Millions of nationals within member states are free to travel and
even to relocate anywhere within the borders of the Community. Of
course, physical boundaries of the Community will restrict the entry of
outsiders, and such restrictions are incompatible with the concept of
Free State. Nonetheless, considering the many wars fought on the Eu-
ropean Continent to forge each nation-state, the evolution of regional
free states within Europe is a significant historical milestone. Other re-
gions may follow the example of the Community to neutralize their
internal frontiers and create regional free states. In the meantime,
global recognition of freedom of movement resulting in the advent of
Free State, however, will occur only after the gap between rich and
poor regions narrows and the world's people gain psychological freedom
from national and regional boundaries.
185. See generally, D. LASOK, J. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (1987) (discussing the European Community in general and legal insti-
tutions and organizations specifically).
186. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 85, at
art. 12, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (recognizing the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose one's residence). Article 12 also declares that everyone is free to
leave any country, including their own. See also Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 110, at art. 13 (proclaiming the right to freedom of movement both
internally and transnationally).
187. See M. McDOUGAL & W. REISMAN, supra note 2, at 790 (1981) (stating that
human dignity prefers free access to all communities).
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B. FREEDOM FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES
The borders of the nation-state are not only physical, but also psy-
chological. Although physical borders are capricious, psychological bor-
ders are concrete. Geographically, for example, natural barriers such as
mountains, oceans and canyons divide but few states. More often, lead-
ers first draw boundaries on a map and then artificially protect them
with border police. For example, oceans border the United States in the
east and west, but in the Southwest, the dividing line between the
United States and Mexico is predominantly unnatural. Similarly, in the
North only an artificial concept divides the vast stretch of nature that
native tribes freely traversed before the emergence of Canada and the
United States. All over the globe, states erected legal and physical
fences to divide what nature left united. Psychologically, meanwhile,
even unnatural borders of the nation-state possess meaning. The psy-
chological boundary between the United States and Mexico, for exam-
ple, looms large even if populations on either side remain indistinguish-
able or substantially related.
Nationality is the primary relationship that binds the individual to
the nation-state. 188 Through the concept of nationality, the nation-state
imposes burdens, such as military service, and confers benefits, such as
diplomatic protection. Nationality, however, is not simply a legal bond
that the state uses to control its nationals; it is also a social fact of
attachment by which individuals acquire sentimental pride in their na-
tion-state. 18 9 Nationals frequently favor their state over all others, work
for its interests and betterment, volunteer for military service, and even
sacrifice their lives defending its honor. States that fail to create patri-
otic sentiments among their nationals remain unstable, break up, and
188. Although the concept of world citizenship exists in common discourse, it has
little validity in international law; almost all peoples of the world are nationals of some
state. The power of states to legislate on matters of nationality is not unlimited. Yet,
states have wide powers to determine under their own law who are their nationals.
Harvard Research in International Law, The Law of Nationality, 23 At. J. INTL L.
Spec. Supp. 11, 80-82 (1929). Lack of nationality may cause statelessness: a stateless
person is one "who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of
its law." Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954. art.
1(1), 360 U.N.T.S. 117. If stateless persons are expelled from a country in which they
lived, there is no state that is required to accept them. Because states have mutually
incoherent nationality laws, some individuals may be born without nationality, and may
never acquire a nationality thereafter. Even though international agreements have
sought to ameliorate the plight of stateless persons, few individuals would choose to
embrace statelessness. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951.
189 U.N.T.S. 137; Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.9/15. In the age of nation-states and their collective control over life in general,
the peoples of the world have no choice but to seek nationality of some state.
189. Nottebohm Case Second Phase (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
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even lose their existence. Patriotic indoctrination, therefore, occurs in
almost all states. Furthermore, states use their coercive legal order to
protect themselves from subversion by imposing stiff penalties for trea-
son, espionage and other offenses against state interests. In fact, some
states go so far as to grossly violate the human rights of their nationals
in order to stifle any criticism of the state or its ideology.
The legal and psychological control that a state exercises over its
nationals disables many individuals from relating to "foreign" peoples
and "foreign" lands. Attachment to the territory of the nation-state
may preclude nationals from having a genuine interest in and concern
for other parts of the world. Allegiance to the defense of the nation-
state may prevent nationals from challenging wrong and unwise state
policies, particularly against foreign peoples and foreign lands. Na-
tional narcissism may impede respect for other cultures and civiliza-
tions, causing ill-will, contempt, and even hatred towards them. Na-
tional fanaticism may even lead to aggression and genocide. Such
artifacts of the nation-state could therefore endanger the physical and
spiritual well-being of global life.
Quite often, psychological boundaries that nation-states wish to de-
velop are capricious from cultural and anthropological viewpoints.
Boundary makers have partitioned ethnic, linguistic, religious and cul-
tural groups which previously lived together for generations. In some
states, meanwhile, segments of the permanent population share nothing
in common except collective obedience to the central state organs. Of
course, all nation-states attempt to forge their nationals together
through sentiments of patriotism. In some cases, however, patriotic at-
tachment to the nation-state fails to develop. The Soviet Union, for ex-
ample, encompassed fifteen republics with disparate historical, sociolog-
ical and cultural backgrounds. Islamic republics in the East do share
little in common with Baltic states in the West. Communist ideology
practiced over several decades failed to unify the population of the So-
viet Union. The declarations of independence announced by most re-
publics after the failed August coup expose the failure of the Soviet
Union to weld together disparate, independent-minded populations. 19 0
Similarly, secessionist movements in India, Canada, and Yugoslavia
demonstrate the cleavage between the state and the people.' 91
190. See N.Y. Times, March 4, 1991 (reporting that Latvia, Estonia and Lithua-
nia, for example, held plebiscites voting in favor of independence).
191. See Sudetic, N.Y. Times, Yugoslav Troops Battle Slovenes, Ending Cease-
Fire, July 3, 1991, at Al (reporting the fighting in Yugoslavia in the wake of Croatia's
and Slovenia's declarations of independence). Likewise, strong separatist movements
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The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians stands as a
tragic and bloody example of conflicting psychological loyalties to the
nation-state. The establishment of the Israeli state forced out hundreds
of thousands of Palestinians from their ancestral territory, making
them refugees in neighboring countries. Opposed to the existence of the
state of Israel, Palestinian activists launched an armed struggle against
the new state and its inhabitants who migrated there to establish a
homeland.1 92 The Palestinians desire to establish their own nation-state,
which Israel opposes. This conflict demonstrates how a nation-state
may fail to accommodate complex human realities, and may invite a
bloody feud between peoples who previously lived together in relative
harmony.'
In accordance with the law of human rights, Free State develops uni-
versal sentiments of human solidarity."" For example, it grants free-
dom from psychological boundaries of the nation-state. This freedom,
however, does not condone anarchy. Rather, Free State proposes or-
dered liberty within the province of universal human rights. Again, the
example of the European Community highlights the evolution of Free
State. For centuries, the British, the French, and the Germans fought
each other in a series of destructive wars, often in the name of country
and patriotism. Now, they decided with other European states to aban-
don aggression and instead create a community of social cooperation,
economic prosperity and human rights.
To create psychological bonding with a larger community rather
then national populations is the objective of the regional Free State. To
instill sentiments of goodwill, friendship, and cooperation among people
is the noble aim of Free State. Free State will achieve these goals with
the gradual extinction of the nation-state.
exist in both Indian Punjab (by Sikhs) and Indian Kashmir (by Muslims). In Canada,
French Quebec seems to be aspiring towards independence.
192. See The Palestinian National Charter of 1968, art. 19, reproduced in 3 The
Arab-Israel Conflict 706 (J. Moore ed. 1974) (declaring that Israel's establishment as
a state to be illegal). Later, in order to open a dialogue with the United States, the
Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in a press conference, renounced
terrorism and recognized the existence of Israel. Hoagland, For Arafat No Turning
Back, Wash. Post, Dec. 22, 1988, at A25.
193. See The Palestinian National Charter of 1968, at art. 19 (recognizing that the
Jews who had normally resided in Palestine will be considered Palestinians). Before the
establishment of Israel, Palestinians and Jews had lived together for many centuries.
194. See Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 110
(recognizing that the inherent dignity and the equal and the inalienable rights of all
members of the human family are the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the
world).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The concept of Free State is rooted in the global forces of economic
interdependence and human rights. As the nation-state loses its histori-
cal claim to exclusive and complete sovereignty, Free State will become
the basis of regional and global political organization. Accordingly, this
normative revolution will also change the character of global life. Free
State protects fundamental human rights and frees people from both
internal and external domination. Furthermore, Free State recognizes
economic interdependence and the need for the free flow of goods, ser-
vices and persons across national boundaries. The citizens of Free State
will shift their loyalty from the nation-state to the World Community,
and share universal sentiments of goodwill with all the world's peoples.
Most likely, regional free states will appear as regions consolidate
their efforts to create a culture of fundamental freedoms and economic
prosperity. The European Community may provide the initial guidance
for creating regional infrastructures conducive to the development of
Free State. Although the future World Community of Free States is a
distant dream, the idea of the Grotian nation-state is becoming increas-
ingly dysfunctional. Perhaps, the concept of Free State is more appro-
priate to accelerate the future development of Global law. 195
195. The term "international law" may be discarded since it emphasizes nations
rather than people. Global law, on the other hand, is a more appropriate term because
it includes the law of human rights and global markets.
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